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Abstract: Prices are a significant driver of health care cost in the United 
States. Existing research on the politics of health system reform has 
emphasized the limited nature of policy entrepreneurs’ efforts at solving the 
problem of rising prices through direct regulation at the state level. Yet this 
literature fails to account for how change agents in the states gradually 
reconfigured the politics of prices, forging new, transparency-based policy 
instruments called all-payer claims databases (APCDs), which are designed to 
empower consumers, purchasers, and states to make informed market and 
policy choices. Drawing on pragmatist institutional theory, this article shows 
how APCDs emerged as the dominant model for reforming health care prices. 
While APCD advocates faced significant institutional barriers to policy change, 
we show how they reconfigured existing ideas, tactical repertoires, and legal-
technical infrastructures to develop a politically and technologically robust 
reform. Our analysis has important implications for theories of how change 
agents overcome structural barriers to health reform.  
Keywords: health care, transparency, all-payer claims databases, 
federalism, United States 
The United States spends more on health care, as both a 
percentage of GDP and on a per capita basis, than any other country. 
In 2009, the year before the adoption of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), health care spending in the United States 
was nearly $8,000 per capita, about $3,000 more than its closest 
competitor, Norway (Squires 2012).1 While numerous factors have 
contributed to this increase—including rapid growth in utilization for 
popular and expensive diagnostic and therapeutic services—recent 
evidence has suggested that health care prices are a particularly 
important, and often overlooked, cause (Oberlander and White 2009; 
Laugesen and Glied 2011; Reinhardt 2012; Bai and Anderson 2015). 
In the private marketplace, responses to the problem of rising prices 
have been limited. As historical accounts suggest, policy innovations 
intended to more stringently standardize prices paid for health services 
have found greater traction within Medicare and Medicaid, while state-
level regulatory frameworks governing the commercial marketplace 
had weak institutional and political footing and were largely dismantled 
by the early 2000s (McDonough 1997a, b; Hackey 1998).  
While the existing literature helps to explain the failure of older 
regulatory frameworks, it cannot account for a significant shift in the 
ideas, interests, and institutions that dominate this policy arena (Sage 
1999). In recent years, advocates of health care reform have 
embraced transparency instruments such as the Physician Compare 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 42, No. 1 (February 2017): pg. 5-52. DOI. This article is © Duke University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Duke University Press. 
3 
 
website, which requires the public posting of information about the 
number and type of services delivered by physicians as well as how 
much Medicare paid them for services (Somashekhar 2014). In the 
private marketplace, however, a central trend has been a convergence 
around a model of state-level all-payer claims databases (APCDs) that 
aim to empower consumers, purchasers, and government officials to 
make informed market and policy choices (CPR 2014). To explain the 
emergence of APCDs, we draw on ideas from pragmatist institutional 
theory, which argues that agents of change facing significant 
institutional constraints often respond by developing the existing 
knowledge base about potentially viable policy ideas, tactics, and 
institutional infrastructures, and repurpose these “raw materials” to 
serve new goals. As we show in this article, organized proponents of 
APCDs retooled existing policy ideas about when and where 
transparency works; repurposed tactical repertoires for state-level 
coalition building and policy formation; and reassembled 
infrastructures for data collection that began to develop in the mid-
1980s as the result of efforts by the National Association of Health 
Data Organizations (NAHDO). APCD advocates used these existing 
ideas, coalitions, and infrastructures in new ways—greatly expanding 
the scope and substance of state transparency measures beyond what 
existed in the past. As a result of these efforts, APCDs have become a 
dominant model for controlling rising medical costs across the fifty 
states.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the existing 
literature on health prices as a policy problem and the response of 
state and federal governments. Second, we introduce our argument 
about institutional reconfiguration and contrast it with the existing 
literature, which cannot account for the emergence of APCDs. Third, 
we test our argument by examining evidence on state innovations in 
the area of price transparency, which began to emerge in the 1980s. 
We conclude by suggesting that the emergence of APCDs has 
important implications both for how we think about the conditions 
under which state governments can become sites of innovation and for 
the value of pragmatist institutional theory for explaining policy 
change in the US context (Stone 1997; Barrilleaux and Brace 2007; 
Sparer, France, and Clinton 2011; Gray, Lowery, and Benz 2013; 
Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman 2014; Studlar 2014).  
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Health Care Prices as a Policy Problem 
Despite the recent deceleration of health care spending in the 
United States, health care expenditures have grown dramatically since 
the 1970s. By 1980, per capita health spending in the United States 
was already much higher than in other advanced industrial countries, 
at over $1,000 a year (in constant dollars), an amount that more than 
quadrupled by 1995 (Squires 2012: 2). Twenty years later, in 2015, 
per capita spending was set to reach $10,000 (Munro 2015). Recent 
data from the OECD shows that the provision of services in the United 
States is generally comparable to that of other countries, suggesting 
that the key component of the United States’ outsized spending is the 
rising prices for services (Bai and Anderson 2015). As Laugesen and 
Glied (2011) suggest, primary care physicians in the United States are 
paid higher fees for office visits in 2009 ($60 for public payers and 
$133 for private payers) than their peers in other OECD countries such 
as Australia, where the fee for office visits is between $34 for public 
payers and $45 for private payers (see also Glied, Ma, and Pearlstein 
2015). The prices typically paid for services and those negotiated with 
providers have remained proprietary trade secrets (Reinhardt 2006). 
Equally important, there is now widespread evidence of price 
discrimination: charges for identical services vary significantly by 
hospital and within hospital by payer (Frakt 2011; Bai and Anderson 
2015).  
The pattern of high and opaque health care prices did not 
emerge in the absence of determined efforts by public and private 
payers. To reform payments in the Medicare program, the Reagan 
Administration—under advisement by Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Richard Schweiker—adapted the idea of diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs) from New Jersey's hospital prospective payment model 
(Mayes 2007; Goldfield 2010). By setting prices in advance of 
admissions, hospitals assumed financial risk for their costs and, as a 
result, learned how to reduce cost drivers such as long hospital stays 
(Guterman et al. 1988). To address rising spending in Medicare in the 
1990s, Congress also passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which 
eliminated retrospective payment for numerous services, including 
post-acute care (Vladeck 2004). Private payers, by contrast, have had 
weaker policy tools at their disposal. In the early 1990s, private payers 
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took a managed-care approach to control costs in the form of network-
based contracting, forcing hospitals to negotiate on prices in exchange 
for inclusion in insurers’ networks (Frakt 2011). Yet, by the end of the 
decade, the unpopularity of these policies with consumers created 
pressure for state and federal reforms that led to less restrictive 
network contracting, giving hospitals greater negotiating power on 
prices (Blendon et al. 1998). As figure 1 shows, while aggregate 
hospital payment-to-cost ratios for Medicare and Medicaid fell below 
the 100 percent “break-even” mark in the early 2000s, private payers 
were still well above that mark, by 15 to 30 percent.  
 
Figure 1. Aggregate Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratio, 1993–2013 
Source: AHA (2014a)  
Note: Medicare and Medicaid trends include payments to disproportionate share 
hospitals.  
Understanding State Efforts to Govern Health 
Prices 
The existing literature on how policy makers have attempted to 
govern health prices in the United States often focuses on explaining 
the failure of state efforts to directly regulate the private marketplace. 
In short, this literature effectively shows that institutional and political 
constraints at the state level led to the breakdown of rate-setting 
regimes. Attempts at controlling prices charged to private insurers 
have, historically speaking, fared poorly compared to reforms within 
public programs, and even efforts in the public sphere have been less 
than robust. In the 1970s and 1980s, 15 states developed systems for 
hospital rate regulation (McDonough 1997a, b; Hackey 1998). 
Congress also encouraged this practice through Medicaid 
demonstration programs that allowed states to hire actuarial 
consultants to develop rates for use in capitated case management 
programs (Freund and Hurley 1987).  
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Yet, despite these investments, rate-setting regimes relied on 
weak institutional foundations. State governments had limited capacity 
to police regulated parties who frequently dodged rate-setting rules 
and requirements. As Hackey (1998) shows, budget cuts, staff 
shortages, and high rates of turnover made it nearly impossible for 
Massachusetts to address significant problems and criticisms in a 
cumbersome rate-setting system. This helped to undermine support 
for rate setting and emboldened the state's hospital association, which 
opposed the policy. In other cases, procedural weaknesses and policy 
complexity enabled regulated parties to capture and manipulate 
regulatory systems to their own advantage. McDonough quotes a New 
Jersey insurance official as comparing the state's rate-setting system 
to “a methadone program, a guaranteed bottom line every year, and 
no one could understand how it worked” (1997b: 114). Given these 
institutional weaknesses, state rate-setting institutions did not create 
strong policy legacies; in most states, no strong constituency emerged 
to defend rate setting against the tide of deregulatory pressures that 
mounted in the 1980s (McDonough 1997a; Melhado 2006). Such 
regimes only persist in Maryland and West Virginia (see table 1). In 
short, states were infertile ground for significant reforms to cope with 
rising health care prices and their future role in this arena would be 
sharply limited.  
Table 1. APCDs in States That Conducted Hospital-Based Rate Setting 
States with Rate-Setting Regimes APCD? 
Arizona No 
Connecticut Yes 
Florida No 
Maine Yes 
Maryland* Yes 
Massachusetts Yes 
Minnesota Yes 
New Jersey No 
New York Yes 
Oregon Yes 
Rhode Island Yes 
Vermont Yes 
Washington Yes 
West Virginia* Yes 
Wisconsin Yes 
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Source: McDonough (1997a, b); Murray and Berenson (2015). ↵Note: * Rate-setting 
regime still in existence.  
What Existing Accounts Miss: The Rise of 
Transparency Instruments 
While the weakness of state institutions helps to explain the 
breakdown of rate-setting regimes, it cannot account for the 
emergence of a new regime oriented around transparency-based 
policy instruments rather than regulatory tools (Sage 1999).2 As figure 
2 shows, since the early 2000s, an increasing number of state 
governments have converged on all-payer claims databases (APCDs), 
data systems that provide comprehensive information on a wide range 
of health costs, quality, and outcomes, including prices paid for 
services (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001). All-payer claims databases, 
which seek to address gaps in information that consumers, purchasers, 
and policy makers have about the prices and quality of health services, 
are becoming dominant in states that once had rate-setting systems. 
Table 1 suggests that, among the fifteen states that once conducted 
some form of rate setting, all but three are currently employing an 
APCD model.  
 
Figure 2. APCD Development in the States, 2009–2015. Sources: NHIHPP (2009); 
Love (2011); Love and Sachs (2013); APCD Council (2015)  
The APCD model was principally developed by members of the 
New England-based Regional All-Payer Health Information Council 
(RAPHIC), founded in 2007 and renamed the APCD Council in 2010 
(NHIHPP 2009). Whereas existing data sources focused on charged 
amounts for health care services, RAPHIC's initial work developed tools 
to bundle together fine-grained data on health encounters that create 
a claim for payment. Since claims data are typically buried in the 
administrative databases of hospitals, insurance plans, and state 
governments, APCDs represent a technologically sophisticated 
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approach to integrating information from a variety of sources to enable 
consumers, purchasers, and policy makers to make valid comparisons 
in the costs, quality, and utilization of health care across providers 
(SHADAC 2011). For instance, states such as Colorado have used 
APCD data to provide consumers with information about how the cost 
of procedures varies across acute care hospitals and other medical 
facilities (CIVHC 2015). New Hampshire's APCD has repackaged this 
data into a website that allows consumers to compare provider prices 
and quality for common health services such as hip replacements and 
births (Porter et al. 2014). States such as Maine and Massachusetts 
have also deployed their data to empower employers to better 
understand the causes of variation in the cost and utilization of 
services, and to adjust their purchasing decisions accordingly (Porter 
et al. 2014).  
As a policy instrument for addressing the problem of health care 
prices, the APCD has three distinctive characteristics. First, it relies on 
a particular set of policy ideas (Campbell 2004). Major proponents of 
APCDs embrace a specific narrative about the causes of high costs and 
low quality in the marketplace for health services. In this narrative, 
private information about the true prices paid for services and the 
quality of services gives those who provide care a significant 
bargaining advantage over purchasers, consumers, and policy makers. 
Yet, addressing these information asymmetries requires information 
that is tailored to the diverse needs of consumers, purchasers, and 
policy makers. As employer groups such as Catalyst for Payment 
Reform put it, APCDs produce information that is essential for 
purchasers to implement “a variety of cost containment strategies, 
including care management of high-cost patients, reference pricing, 
centers of excellence for high-cost, complex services, and other 
strategies including wellness incentives and more extensive coverage 
of preventive care” (Delbanco 2014). Similarly, consumer groups who 
support APCDs such as Families USA argue that information on prices 
and the quality of services is essential for prudent purchasing, often 
citing research that shows consumers are more likely to select high-
value care when they have access to easily interpretable information 
on price and quality (Families USA 2014). Finally, groups representing 
state-level policy makers—including the National Governors 
Association (NGA) and the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL)—have embraced APCDs as a means of enhancing cost control 
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within Medicaid programs and other innovative health care models, as 
well as monitoring and improving population health (NGA et al. 2015).  
Second, the main organization supporting these policies, the 
APCD Council, uses a distinctive tactical repertoire to overcome weak 
state capacity and opposition to policy change (Tilly 1986). At the core 
of this repertoire is a commitment to “articulating and communicating 
the purpose of the APCD to multiple cross-cutting stakeholders, often 
elaborating uses that extend beyond price transparency” (APCD 
Council 2015: 5). Policy entrepreneurs define a rationale and purpose 
for APCDs through a “robust stakeholder engagement process” which 
links payers, providers, consumers, and state officials together to 
collectively define a shared vision and infrastructure for the database—
and to build support for multiple uses of the APCD beyond price 
transparency itself (APCD Council 2015). To address weak policy 
capacity in the states, the APCD Council also facilitates external 
capacity borrowing by seeking grants and guidance from federal 
agencies such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ); seeking policy input from the Accredited Standards 
Committee X12 (ASC X12); and securing support from state-based 
organizations such as the NGA and the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) (Love 2011).3 Finally, to deal with 
potential opposition to APCDs in the states, the Council builds evidence 
from existing examples of policy implementation, demonstrating the 
costs of interstate policy inconsistencies and the benefits of the APCD 
model (see, e.g., Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian 1985; Kelemen 2004).  
Third, APCDs run on a unique legal and technical infrastructure 
that transforms raw administrative data into calculable information 
about health care prices and outcomes (Bowker and Star 1999; 
Muniesa 2007). This infrastructure is made up of both state laws that 
mandate the disclosure of health data across multiple payers and care 
settings as well as data systems and organizations which allow states 
to collect and store information on prices paid for services. Existing 
sources of data on health care, such as hospital discharge data sets, 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, and administrative data tend to 
be limited by a patient population or the point of care where data is 
gathered (Miller et al. 2010). By contrast, APCDs gather data on health 
care claims from across the commercial marketplace, public programs, 
and a wide range of care settings. As table 2 shows, in states such as 
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Colorado, APCDs capture any bill or claim relating to a third-party 
payer, and only lack data on services provided free of charge or 
charged to individuals directly, without the involvement of an insurer.  
Table 2: Information Typically Collected by Colorado's APCD 
Encrypted member identification code Pharmacy claims information 
Patient demographics Revenue codes 
Location of services and facility type Type of health plan 
Service dates Type of contract 
Information on service provider Health plan payment 
Diagnosis, procedure, and national drug codes Type and date of bill paid 
 
Member payment responsibility 
Source: APCD Council (2015)  
 
Accounting for the Emergence of APCDs: Insights 
from Pragmatist Institutional Theory 
The existing literature on the limited success of state efforts to 
govern health care prices is consistent with a broader finding in 
historical-institutionalist research on health care reform, which 
emphasizes how structural factors constrain policy development and 
implementation of public policy (e.g., Steinmo and Watts 1995). Yet, 
by focusing on how weak state capacity limited regulatory policy, the 
existing literature cannot account for how policy entrepreneurs 
developed the kind of policy expertise and political skill necessary to 
generate a new model of reform like the APCD. This is especially 
difficult given that policy expertise is scarce in many states and costly 
to develop (Barrilleaux and Brace 2007; Evans 2011), and that state-
level entrepreneurs often face entrenched opposition (Schneider, 
Teske, and Mintrom 2011; Gray, Lowery, and Benz 2013).  
To explain the emergence of APCDs, we borrow insights from 
what Ansell (2011) refers to as pragmatist institutional theory, a 
perspective that emphasizes the tracing of how people actually 
experience institutional rules (in our case, procedurally weak state 
agencies with few resources available to govern health care prices). As 
Berk and Galvan (2013), Herrera (2013), and Amberg (2013) have 
argued, institutions have no agency of their own, either to hamper or 
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enable policy change agents. Rather, they are bundles of raw materials 
“available for creative reinterpretation or recombination” by change 
agents (Berk and Galvan 2013: 29). Even when agents lack formal 
authority or clear capacity to initiate policy changes, they use available 
institutions and resources in unintended ways to achieve their goals. 
Unlike entrepreneurs in Kingdon's (1984) “multiple streams model,” 
such agents do not use “off the shelf” ideas, institutions, or 
infrastructures “as is.” Rather, they reassemble those “raw materials” 
for new purposes (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Campbell 2004; Carstensen 
2011; Amberg 2013).4 For instance, Epstein (1996) shows how 
politically weak AIDS activists strategically repurposed existing 
institutional elements such as clinical trials and federally funded 
research projects to press a recalcitrant Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for expanded access to experimental treatments. While the FDA 
had the formal authority to shape the rules on access to experimental 
treatments, AIDS activists cobbled together resources and institutional 
processes at hand, resulting in a successful challenge to powerful 
bureaucratic actors (Epstein 1996).  
Taken together, these empirical studies characterize a process 
we refer to as institutional reconfiguration, in which policy 
entrepreneurs creatively recombine existing institutional resources to 
develop new ideas, tactical repertoires, and infrastructures to 
challenge existing policies.5 Especially given the politically fraught 
legacy of rate setting, we argue that APCDs are likely to have emerged 
from such a process. There are three empirical implications of our 
argument. First, to develop their arguments about the value of APCDs, 
state-level advocates of APCDs should creatively repurpose existing 
ideas from experts and public officials about the value of accurate 
information on the cost and quality of health care, both for correcting 
market failures and empowering policy makers and citizens to take 
more decisive action. Second, APCD advocates should build upon 
existing tactical repertoires for developing diverse support coalitions 
made up of consumers, purchasers, and policy makers at multiple 
levels of government. Third, we expect APCD advocates to construct 
new policy models by using existing legal and technical infrastructures, 
including pre-existing state laws, health information databases, and 
administrative organizations. By contrast, if agents are capable of 
creating APCDs with little political or institutional friction, and without 
relying extensively on existing ideas, infrastructures, or tactical 
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repertoires, it is unlikely that reconfiguration accounts for the 
emergence of claims databases.  
Data and Methods 
To test our claim about the emergence of APCDs, we collected 
and analyzed documents published by the APCD Council (N=33), 
including manuals, issue briefs, PowerPoint presentations, and 
webinars.6 From these documents, we developed a list of ideas, 
tactical repertoires, and legal-technical infrastructures critical to the 
development of APCDs. Second, we used the documents to assemble a 
list of key actors and events in the development of the APCD model, 
and supplemented our initial document analysis by examining publicly 
available APCD Council meeting minutes, secondary literature, and 
government reports. Finally, we conducted background interviews with 
two key informants who participated in the founding of the APCD 
Council. These interviews helped to confirm key features of our 
narrative and fill in gaps where necessary.  
Institutional Reconfiguration and the Emergence 
of All-Payer Claims Databases 
In this section, we present the results of our analysis. We begin 
by describing the formation of the APCD Council and how a preexisting 
network of health data policy experts informed the Council's policy 
ideas and strategies. In particular, members of the National 
Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) were pivotal in 
providing the APCD Council with three important “raw materials” it 
reconfigured to develop its core policy model. As the sections that 
follow show, the APCD Council built its model for transparency reform 
by retooling existing policy ideas, repurposing existing tactical 
repertoires, and reassembling legal and technical infrastructures. We 
conclude the section by discussing how the Council's efforts have 
expanded the constituency for, and uses of, health data transparency 
as a policy instrument.  
NAHDO as a Source of “Raw Materials” for APCDs 
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All-payer claims databases first emerged in the early 2000s, 
resulting from the efforts of state officials in Maine, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire, as well as the University of New Hampshire's 
Institute for Health Policy and Practice (NHIHPP 2009). To develop and 
diffuse their policy instrument of choice, APCD advocates reconfigured 
ideas, infrastructures, and tactical repertoires that had existed since 
the 1980s. What made it possible for APCD advocates to borrow and 
repurpose these existing “raw materials” is their relationship to a 
network of policy experts at NAHDO, an organization with a long track 
record in the area of health data policy, whose members well 
understood the potential and limits of existing information-oriented 
policy solutions (Love and Rudolph 2012).  
Soon after transparency advocates in New England formed the 
Regional All-Payer Health Information Council (RAPHIC), RAPHIC's Al 
Prysunka, Craig Schneider, and Patrick Miller sought out the help of 
NAHDO's Executive Director, Denise Love (Love 2008; Schneider and 
Shah 2008; NHIHPP 2009). Reaching out to Love made a great deal of 
sense; by the early 2000s, NAHDO was the principal champion of 
health data transparency in the United States. Founded during a 1986 
meeting sponsored by the Washington Business Group on Health, the 
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, and George Washington 
University's Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, NAHDO had long 
“supported activities of state-level agencies that are mandated to 
collect, disseminate, and use hospital discharge datasets” and efforts 
to increase “the uniformity of the [health] data being collected, its 
coding, and accessibility” (NAHDO 2015). As NAHDO framed it, the 
purpose of these data initiatives went far beyond price transparency 
alone. Rather, NAHDO advocated for a variety of policies that 
encouraged health care purchasers to base their decisions on price and 
quality rather than cost (NAHDO 1988). As later sections will reveal, 
this broad framing was essential to NAHDO's ability to build coalitions 
(Overman and Cahill 1994).  
In April 2008, NAHDO's network ties began to pay off for APCD 
advocates when the organization secured a grant from the 
Commonwealth Fund to stage the first National All-Payer Claims 
Database Conference, which was attended by representatives from 
more than twenty states, as well as federal agencies, universities, 
hospitals, health plans, and purchasers (NHIHPP 2009: 5). During her 
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introductory remarks at the conference, Denise Love explained that 
NAHDO had been “dedicated to the improvement and public 
availability of health care data since 1986” and, since then, had 
developed extensive organizational expertise (Love 2008). By 
coordinating national meetings of state data organizations, Love 
suggested, NAHDO had helped advocates of transparency reform to 
learn from and build on successful past efforts:  
We've got several states who have figured this out, so let's get 
them all in a room and, you know, don't reinvent the wheel and 
get those states who have to ramp up quickly to pick the brains 
of those that know how to do it . . . I think as we've seen with 
hospital data we get some states that figure it out. They give 
the lessons learned to the other states who figure out new 
things, and we keep that sharing and we keep that loop going. 
(Love 2008) 
With NAHDO's help, RAPHIC's membership quickly grew beyond 
New England to include states as far west as Utah and Hawaii; the 
organization soon renamed itself the APCD Council (APCD Council 
2015). Yet, the Council relied on NAHDO for more than growing its 
membership. Rather, members of the APCD Council began to draw on 
NAHDO's extensive knowledge of health data policy. As an example of 
this process in action, table 3 assesses NAHDO coauthorship of publicly 
available APCD Council reports. Of 33 APCD Council documents, 22 (67 
percent) were coauthored by at least one member of NAHDO. As the 
following sections suggests, APCD advocates did not build health data 
reforms from scratch. Rather, with help from NAHDO, they repurposed 
existing ideas, infrastructures, and tactical repertoires to build reforms 
that were more politically and institutionally robust.  
Table 3. NAHDO/APCD Council Coauthorships 
Documents with At Least One APCD 
Council Coauthor 
No. (%) of Documents with 
NAHDO Coauthor 
Manual/guidebook (N = 6)  6 (100%) 
Analysis of past APCD efforts (N = 4)  4 (100%) 
Issue brief or fact sheet (N = 9)  4 (44%) 
Webinars (N = 11)  6 (55%) 
Other (N = 3)  2 (67%) 
Total (N = 33)  22 (67%) 
Source: Authors’ analysis; see appendix 
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Note: Excludes twenty-seven documents published on site without at least one APCD 
Council coauthor.  
Reshaping Health Data Policy Ideas: 
Dissemination and Integration 
NAHDO was founded at the high point of market-oriented ideas 
in health policy (Overman and Cahill 1994; Sage 1999).7 Since the 
initial Medicare “cost crisis” of the early 1970s, reformers in successive 
presidential administrations had embraced the ideal of “properly 
functioning medical markets,” in which “providers would race to win 
consumers, lowering costs and raising quality” (Morone 1988: 106). 
Adherents of the “competitive markets” approach argued that, in order 
to improve payers’ and consumers’ ability to buy low-cost and high-
quality services, government agencies had to collect better information 
(Enthoven 1978; Kronick 1992; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). With the 
creation of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR)—
later renamed the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ)—in 1989, reformers also embraced the collection of data to 
support the development of clinical guidelines, which they argued 
would control costs by reducing the inappropriate use of health care 
services (Grogan et al. 1994). Indeed, by 1988, NAHDO documents 
also argued that government should develop information-collection 
and dissemination policies to ensure that “price and quality, in addition 
to cost” would become core purchasing criteria for health care (NAHDO 
1988).  
To develop a rationale for APCDs, members of the Council 
worked with NAHDO leadership to reconfigure two policy ideas about 
how enhanced collection and dissemination of health data, as opposed 
to direct regulation, could improve the quality and cost of health care 
(see table 4 for summary). First, APCD advocates helped to reshape 
NAHDO ideas about the value of information. As NAHDO leadership 
observed the results of health data reforms, they began to develop a 
more specific understanding of how and when information might work. 
For example, a 2001 Health Services Research article coauthored by 
Denise Love, NAHDO Deputy Director Luis Paita, and health services 
researcher William S. Custer argued that transparency reforms could 
only improve competition in health markets when they provided 
“economic value to purchasers and providers” by delivering 
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information that “strengthens their decision making in a timely manner 
in formats that are relevant to their users” (Love, Paita, and Custer 
2001: 286). Without up-to-date information on medical errors and the 
costs associated with them, for example, it would be difficult for 
purchasers to make decisions to shape benefit plans. Moreover, 
transparency programs were more likely to be successful when 
providers and purchasers had “financial incentives for participation” in 
data collection and use (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001: 286).  
Table 4. Ideas Reconfigured by APCD Council 
“Raw Material” Influence on APCD 
Development 
How APCD Council 
Reconfigured 
Information, as 
opposed to direct 
regulation, can be a 
tool for health care 
reform. 
Rationale for government 
action on health care cost 
and quality without direct 
rate setting. 
Created data products and 
dissemination strategies that 
better reflected needs and 
incentive structures of end-
users. 
Databases are a key 
information-based 
policy instrument. 
Conceptual model for 
policy. 
Defined approach to data 
integration to address data gaps, 
need for standardization, and 
appropriate indicators. 
All-payer claims database advocates drew on and gradually 
reshaped this idea. At the first RAPHIC/NAHDO–hosted conference, 
New Hampshire officials Tyler Brannen and Andrew Chalsma gave 
examples of how their agencies were working to develop products 
tailored to consumers, purchasers, and providers (Brannen 2008; 
Chalsma 2008). Soon, Colorado adapted the idea by allowing 
“providers, purchasers, researchers, and other organizations” to 
request “limited custom reports and data sets to support the Triple 
Aim of improving care for individuals, improving health for populations, 
and lowering costs” (CIVHC 2015: 26–27).  
Yet, as leaders of NAHDO and the Council put it in an issue 
brief, political opposition to the release of some payment data on the 
part of some insurers and providers—who viewed some kinds of 
payment information as proprietary—made customized data release 
“the most sensitive aspect of APCD implementation,” a fact reflected in 
the “variation in policies and practices across states” (Porter et al. 
2014: 4). Given this delicate political situation, the APCD Council 
initially resisted adopting any single definition of “good” data release 
policies; rather, its reports gradually began to embrace a model that 
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emphasized multiple data products for a variety of user populations 
(Miller et al. 2010). By 2015, the Council's All-Payer Claims Database 
Development Manual embraced a more specific set of user-centered 
options for data release (APCD Council 2015: 93).8 
A second core NAHDO idea that APCD advocates borrowed and 
reshaped concerned the kind of data that was necessary to enable 
market reform. In the 1990s, NAHDO built a strong reputation for 
helping states to create databases of patient discharges from inpatient 
hospitals, emergency departments, and ambulatory surgery centers 
(Overman and Cahill 1994; Boles and Hicks 1995; Eaton 2013). Yet by 
2001, NAHDO leaders argued, “No single data source will likely ever 
provide a complete snapshot of health and health system 
performance” (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001: 286). Instead, since 
service delivery spilled over sites of care and data sources, new 
database models should focus on: (1) linking sources of discharge data 
with claims data to evaluate patterns of care and document variations 
in health practices and outcomes; (2) including data elements that 
reflected changes in the marketplace, such as a gradual move to 
outpatient settings; and (3) standardizing data elements to enable 
valid comparisons across states and care settings (Love, Paita, and 
Custer 2001: 285–86).  
Advocates of APCDs borrowed on these ideas, arguing that 
integrating, updating, and standardizing multiple types of health data 
was essential to developing “data-driven health reform efforts 
resulting in impacts (including improved access to care, reduced costs, 
and improved quality) that can be effectively measured” (Miller et al. 
2010: 5). During a meeting held by NAHDO and RAPHIC in 2009, 
Denise Love argued that APCDs provided a conceptual model that 
could address these issues (NHIHPP 2009: 6). As RAPHIC's Patrick 
Miller put it, the concept of the APCD emphasized the inclusion of 
common types of data from private or commercial payers, Medicaid, 
and Medicare. This concept could be extended to include other 
sources, including federal employees, workers’ compensation, and 
uninsured claims data. All-payer claims databases also provided a legal 
framework for data submission by carriers, third-party administrators, 
and pharmacy benefits managers (NHIHPP 2009: 7–8).9 Within a year, 
APCD Council issue briefs argued that by linking data from multiple 
sources together, claims databases held the potential for a “much 
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deeper understanding of patterns, quality, and costs of care across the 
entire population” (Miller et al. 2010: 5), and could answer a variety of 
questions, including but not limited to: “which hospitals have the 
highest prices?”; “which health plan has the best discounts?”; and “are 
established clinical guideline measurements related to quality, safety, 
and continuity of care being met?” (Miller et al. 2010: 5–6). By 2015, 
the Council could claim that APCDs provided the main model used by 
states to “fill critical information gaps, promote health care 
transparency initiatives, and provide actionable information for their 
stakeholders” (APCD Council 2015: 3).  
Repurposing Tactical Repertoires: Coalitions, 
Resources, and Frames 
To deal with institutional barriers to reform, NAHDO also 
embraced tactical repertoires that organized multiple coalition partners 
in reform, including actors from the business sector, who found it 
difficult to mobilize in the absence of a central political entrepreneur 
and were likely to be suspicious of state-oriented policy solutions 
(Brown 1993; Martin 1993).10 Throughout the 1990s, NAHDO 
meetings, workshops, and conferences articulated a distinctive model 
of coalition building that relied on consumer and purchaser groups 
(Overman and Cahill 1994; Eaton 2013: 92). A frequently cited 
example of this model is a 1986 effort by health reformers in 
Pennsylvania, including State Rep. Mark Cohen (D–Philadelphia). 
Initially, Cohen had pushed for a “truth-in-treatment” list of hospital 
prices, which would be published regularly in newspapers, but ran into 
opposition from hospital associations that ultimately undermined the 
initiative (Regulating Health Care Costs 1985). Undaunted, Cohen 
courted support from employers, labor unions, and officials in the 
state's Republican administration who were interested in improving the 
quality of health data to empower a variety of approaches to cost- and 
quality-control beyond price transparency, including utilization control 
and patient safety initiatives (Health Care Cost Containment Act 1986; 
Overman and Cahill 1994). The result was the adoption in 1986 of a 
bipartisan reform, Act 89. While Act 89 created nothing like the price 
transparency measures Cohen and his supporters had initially 
envisioned, it did require hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers to 
provide raw cost and utilization data on all covered medical services to 
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a newly created Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
(PHC4) made up of state officials, payers, and providers (PHC4 2003).  
All-payer claims database advocates repurposed three tactical 
repertoires that NAHDO developed in the 1990s (see summary in table 
5). First, and perhaps most importantly, the APCD Council repurposed 
NAHDO techniques for building support for data reforms among 
multiple stakeholders. By the early 2000s, NAHDO leadership had 
recognized that persistent provider opposition had hampered even 
modest attempts at data collection and dissemination reforms. As one 
NAHDO-supported study put it, mandatory data collection systems 
“may take years to enact and implement” and may require tradeoffs 
with providers during the legislative process that result in “restrictions 
in public reporting, such as prohibition of collection or disclosure of 
provider-level data” (Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project 2004: 7). 
By contrast, voluntary systems may “meet with less resistance from 
the provider community” but would still allow providers to refuse to 
participate, be subject to private “deal-making,” and “lack 
transparency in collection and analytic methods” (Consumer-Purchaser 
Disclosure Project 2004: 7). To address these concerns, NAHDO 
contracted with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to examine 
how state discharge databases could be used not only by purchasers 
but also by providers and provider associations who had generally 
opposed such measures (Schoenman et al. 2005). Their investigation 
found numerous examples of how states such as Montana used 
administrative data to conduct benchmarking on the “length of stay 
and charges for common inpatient diagnoses” (Schoenman et al. 
2005: 72). In other states, hospitals used discharge data to satisfy 
requirements to report to state disease registries and meet federal 
program reporting requirements (Schoenman et al. 2005: 68–77).  
Table 5. Tactics Reconfigured by APCD Council 
“Raw Material” Influence on APCD 
Development 
How APCD Council 
Reconfigured 
Building coalitions around 
multipurpose datasets. 
Model for coalition 
building with consumer, 
purchaser groups. 
Expanded coalition to build 
support for collecting, 
disseminating claims data. 
Facilitating transfer of 
capacity between federal 
and state agencies, among 
states. 
Network of partners for 
policy planning, 
development. 
Used network to diffuse new 
policy model, integrate data 
sources, advocate for metadata 
standards. 
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“Raw Material” Influence on APCD 
Development 
How APCD Council 
Reconfigured 
Deploying evidence on the 
benefits of standard health 
data policies across state 
lines. 
Rationale for new states 
to emulate existing 
policies. 
Built consensus on core data 
elements with technical 
advisory panel. 
Thus, by the time RAPHIC was formed, its members had 
examples of how to build coalitions around multipurpose datasets, a 
repertoire they began to use to build support for the APCD model 
(NHIHPP 2009; Wadhwa 2010). As one APCD advocate in Oregon later 
put it, “NAHDO meetings and webinars laid the foundation” for 
coalition-building efforts (Kolmer 2013: 12). Using the language of 
software development, APCD advocates began to suggest that state 
leaders engage with stakeholders to develop a set of “use cases,” or 
concrete examples, of “what questions APCDs will answer for which 
stakeholders,” which would ultimately become part of a “showcase” on 
the council's website (APCD Council 2015: 17). These use cases helped 
APCD advocates to expand the number of potential stakeholders to 
include state legislators, executive agencies, and providers (see table 
6). For example, since health care providers had “historically felt that 
claims data and billing practices are not accurate enough to support 
reporting at the individual or provider level,” the All-Payer Claims 
Database Development Manual provided examples of states that 
initially reported data at higher levels of aggregation than individual 
providers to address concerns about data quality. The APCD Council's 
publications also illustrated how providers used claims data from the 
New Hampshire Accountable Care Project to analyze regional-level 
reporting on cost, utilization, and disease characteristics (Porter and 
Love 2013; APCD Council 2015).  
Table 6. Common APCD Stakeholders and Concerns 
Stakeholder Concerns Approach to Addressing Concerns 
Policy makers Cost and 
infrastructure 
requirements; 
safeguards. 
Stakeholder engagement; identify 
diversified funding structure, build off 
existing systems and legislation for data 
collection. 
Payers Burden of data 
submission; 
disclosure of 
negotiated rates. 
Include payers at the beginning, 
throughout APCD cycle, use existing 
standards to minimize data collection 
burden, establish protocols for release.  
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Stakeholder Concerns Approach to Addressing Concerns 
Providers Believe that claims 
data are inaccurate 
for assessing value. 
Include providers in stakeholder 
meetings; use higher level of 
aggregation than individual providers to 
address concerns about data quality at 
the individual provider level, initially.  
Employers Benchmarks for 
consumer-friendly 
price transparency. 
Include employers in stakeholder 
groups, specify requirements of 
reporting entities. 
State agencies Maximizing use of 
APCD data and 
oversight. 
Establish memoranda of understanding, 
data use agreements. 
Consumers Benchmarks for 
consumer-friendly 
price transparency; 
privacy. 
Include consumers in stakeholder 
groups, create robust data safeguards. 
Health information 
exchanges (HIE) and 
Health insurance 
exchanges (HIX) 
Technical barriers to 
linking data. 
Include HIE and HIX leadership in APCD 
stakeholder groups. 
Source: APCD Council (2015)  
A second tactic the APCD Council borrowed from NAHDO was 
facilitating the transfer of resources both among states and between 
states and federal agencies. Throughout the 1980s, advocates of 
health data reform lacked the resources, expertise, or professional 
credentials to convince potential stakeholders that access to hospital 
cost and utilization data would be worth the trouble to collect 
(Imershein, Rond, and Mathis 1992). Yet, soon after NAHDO's creation 
in 1986, the organization initiated efforts to share resources with 
reformers with little planning capacity of their own, allowing states 
with few resources to connect with states that offered to share 
computer code, access to data servers, and linkages with high-quality 
vendors (Eaton 2013). By the early 2000s, NAHDO had also become a 
clearinghouse for measurement tools that illustrated the value of 
health data sharing and dissemination policies (Love, Paita, and Custer 
2001: 282–84). In 2007, for example, NAHDO assisted advocates of 
new health data legislation by publishing reports on how states with 
similar fiscal and political scenarios, including South Carolina, had 
benefited from implementing a patient-level statewide reporting 
system (NAHDO 2007: 15–17). NAHDO also facilitated states’ access 
to policy planning capacity that existed in federal agencies. In the 
1990s, the organization acquired funding for the development of 
inventories of state data elements from AHCPR (later AHRQ) for the 
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creation of statewide health databases (NAHDO 1997). Using grants 
from AHRQ's Building Research Infrastructure and Capacity program, 
NAHDO assisted eligible states in the development of data 
clearinghouses, communications modules, and health quality indicators 
(AHRQ 2001). Under the auspices of AHRQ's Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project, NAHDO also secured capacity to conduct research 
on the obstacles of collecting and improving outpatient datasets, and 
to identify technical and organizational priorities in the development of 
national outpatient data standards (NAHDO 2005; Andrews 2013).  
The APCD Council adapted the capacity-sharing tactic to build 
and diffuse its core database model (Costello and Taylor 2011; Love 
and Sullivan 2011; Love and Sachs 2013; Porter et al. 2014). Through 
a variety of mechanisms, including a Technical Advisory Panel, the 
Council made key links to insurers such as WellPoint, policy 
professionals at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
elected officials at the National Conference of State Legislatures, and 
members of standards development organizations (see table 7). These 
stakeholders became critical to the Council's consensus-building 
process. Prior to issuing its recommendations for standardizing APCD 
data formats, for example, the Council spent over a year conducting 
sessions with these organizations and gaining their input on the final 
set of recommendations (Love 2011). State governors identified 
opportunities for making the “business case for why [an APCD] helps 
the state” and demonstrating that the data APCDs proposed to collect 
“match[ed] state priorities” (Finnegan 2010: 6). Further, the Council 
drew on support from AHRQ, which began to promote APCD Council 
metadata standards through its US Health Information Knowledgebase 
(USHIK) (Chudy 2010; Fitzmaurice 2010).  
Table 7. Examples of National Organizations Linked to the APCD Council 
Federal agencies: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
National Center for Health Statistics (CDC/NCHS), HHS Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE).  
National associations of state officials: National Association of Health Data 
Organizations (NAHDO), National Governors Association (NGA), National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL), National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD).  
Standards development organizations: Accredited Standards Committee X12 
(ASC X12), National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP).  
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Insurance industry: America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), UnitedHealth Group, 
WellPoint, Kaiser Permanente, Aetna.  
Academic/research: AcademyHealth, University of New Hampshire.  
Philanthropy: Commonwealth Fund, Gary and Mary West Center, Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation.  
Source: APCD Council (2011); Love (2011)  
Note: List is not exhaustive.  
A final NAHDO tactic that the APCD Council repurposed was 
identifying the benefits of standardizing data policies across state 
lines. Since NAHDO's founding, its leaders carefully monitored 
variations in state health data policies (NAHDO 1989). In 1990 and 
1991, for example, NAHDO surveyed states to ask what data they 
collected on health costs as well as its accessibility to consumers and 
insurers (Boles and Hicks 1995). The report based on these surveys 
illustrated two important contrasts between advanced states such as 
Pennsylvania—the only state that collected and published reports using 
mortality data—and states such as Indiana, which provided data only 
on hospital charges and service volume, and Delaware, which provided 
data to the public but only after a lengthy and costly approval process. 
As a 1991 Health Affairs article that reported on the “sorely needed” 
NAHDO study suggested: “the average consumer and even the fairly 
sophisticated employee benefits manager, unless they choose their 
state very carefully, may be out of luck” (Singer 1991: 151). From 
these surveys NAHDO issued periodic reports such as A Guide to 
State-Level Ambulatory Healthcare Data Collection, which outlined 
states’ response to the health care system's shift from inpatient to 
outpatient care (NAHDO 1997). Rather than lay out a clear series of 
policy recommendations, however, the report billed itself as a “first-
time-ever attempt to gather and produce information” on patient-level 
data collection activities in numerous outpatient settings (NAHDO 
1997: 1). Perhaps even more importantly, surveys, state scorecards, 
and reports that analyzed differences among states built political 
tension by publicizing heterogeneity. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, NAHDO continued to produce reports that publicized the 
imbalance between state transparency frameworks and the need for 
reform. In 2007, for example, NAHDO leveraged interstate disparities 
in health costs to persuade state legislators in Mississippi that 
developing a comprehensive data collection system would dramatically 
bring down state health spending (NAHDO 2007: 14).  
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Members of the APCD Council repurposed this tactic. To be sure, 
advocates of APCDs recognized the importance of illustrating the 
benefits of a standardized policy model that would minimize 
inequitable geographic operational costs. They frequently used 
examples of how standardizing APCD data requirements across states 
“creates efficiency in terms of getting the information (from the data) 
back to the providers and the consumers for decision making” (NHIHPP 
2009: 16). Yet, at the same time, Council reports emphasized that 
varying coalitions and policy constraints across states might lead to 
different analysis and reporting tools as well as unique mixes of data 
elements (APCD Council 2015: 48). To circumvent these challenges, 
the Council staged meetings with national organizations to develop 
consensus across all fifty states “to ensure that states collecting the 
same data would do so in the same manner” (Costello and Taylor 
2011: 2). Supported by AHIP and an AHRQ task order in 2009 and 
2010, the Council formed a Technical Advisory Panel made up of state 
and federal policy makers, payers, and provider groups (see table 7) 
(APCD Council 2011). The result of these meetings was a capacious 
set of common data elements that APCDs would include, such as 
procedure codes, diagnoses, and payment amounts (APCD Council, 
UNH, and NAHDO 2012). To facilitate the diffusion of these standards, 
the Council partnered with the Accredited Standards Committee X12 
(ASC X12) to develop a Uniform Medical Claims Payer Reporting 
Standard and data reporting implementation guides (APCD Council 
2011; ASC X12 2012). Standardizing claims data reporting, as the 
Council's Patrick Miller put it, would “result in lowered administrative 
costs for payers, enable states to more easily share data between 
them, provide predictability for vendors, states, and payers on data 
layouts, and provide a public forum for the addition of new data 
elements as APCDs evolve nationally to meet state transparency and 
national health reform needs” (ASC X12 2011).  
Reassembling Health Data Infrastructure: Laws, 
Databases, and Organizations 
In addition to reshaping ideas and tactical repertoires for 
information-based health policy instruments, advocates of APCDs 
reassembled three types of existing legal and technical infrastructures 
that NAHDO had been instrumental in building in the late 1980s and 
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1990s (see summary in table 8). While these existing laws and 
databases were designed for a variety of purposes, the APCD model 
showed how these disparate data sources could be stitched together to 
address gaps in the knowledge of policy makers, consumers, and 
purchasers about “how and where health care dollars are being spent” 
(Miller et al. 2010: 5).  
Table 8. Infrastructures Reconfigured by APCD Council 
“Raw Material” Influence on APCD 
Development 
How APCD Council 
Reconfigured 
State health data 
legislation (e.g., PA Act 
89). 
Precedent and institutional 
framework for all-payer 
reforms. 
Drafted new legislation to 
expand sites, populations 
covered by health data laws. 
State and federal 
databases (e.g., 
Washington State 
VistaPHw). 
Technical and 
organizational capacity for 
database development. 
Developed new technical 
model for collecting, 
managing, and disseminating 
data. 
State data agencies (e.g., 
Maine Health Data 
Organization). 
Organizational capacity for 
database development. 
Developed new organizational 
model to support APCDs. 
A first important infrastructure the APCD Council reassembled 
was a diverse set of laws that required health care providers and 
payers to disclose health information. Legislation enabling state 
governments to collect health data from providers and payers emerged 
sporadically in the 1970s and 1980s, growing significantly after the 
founding of NAHDO in 1986 (see fig. 3). Early reforms included 
Certificate of Need laws, which enabled states to collect data on 
inpatient hospital stays. Yet states were slow to develop data on costs 
and utilization on physician visits, nursing home stays, and ambulatory 
care services (NAHDO 1993). By the early 2000s, NAHDO surveys 
revealed that virtually all states had some data-collection strategy in 
place, but that data collection was largely limited to inpatient 
discharges, and often failed to include information on ambulatory 
surgical units and emergency departments (NAHDO 2007).  
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Figure 3. State Legislative Enactments Supporting Health Data Collection 
(Cumulative), 1970–2012 Source: Authors’ tabulation of CPR (2014)  
Despite the weaknesses of existing legislative frameworks, 
APCD advocates explicitly recognized the importance of building on 
what exists rather than “reinventing the wheel.” For example, policy 
entrepreneurs in New York maneuvered around organized opponents 
by including the measure in 2011 budget legislation and packaging the 
measure as an update to the state's Statewide Planning and Research 
Cooperative System (SPARCS) which had existed since 1979 but had 
not collected financial information on health care services beyond 
charges (Senate Bill 2809D 2011; Miller et al. 2015: 2–3). Under the 
new proposal, the New York Department of Health began to integrate 
SPARCS's discharge data with information on claims and clinical data 
from regional health organizations across multiple payers (New York 
Department of Health 2015). To support the effort, the APCD Council 
monitored the first four years of implementation and provided a series 
of recommendations for further adapting routines for stakeholder 
engagement and data-quality management (Miller et al. 2015). These 
reforms, the Council argued, would help to address political opposition 
to the law from payers that saw requirements for data release as an 
“unfunded mandate” or a violation of antitrust laws (Miller et al. 2015: 
65–66).  
Second, APCD advocates built upon an existing physical 
infrastructure made up of health databases. Since the 1990s, state 
health data organizations had focused their energies on creating 
databases that covered information on hospital discharges, which 
represented a significant improvement on existing administrative and 
employment-based reporting systems’ critical data elements, which 
rarely contained significant provider-level information (Schoenman et 
al. 2005). These databases were designed to provide raw data to 
purchasers or state officials in raw form, and were rarely repackaged 
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for consumers, except in occasional consumer guides (Overman and 
Cahill 1994).  
To implement the new claims database model, the APCD Council 
and its members provided guides for how to use and adapt existing 
data sources for new purposes (Love 2011; Love and Steiner 2011; 
APCD Council 2015). One of the earliest challenges states faced was 
ensuring that payer data submissions were complete and accurate. To 
address these challenges, states such as Massachusetts worked with 
payers to develop manuals to guide the data submission process 
(CHIA 2014). To address scrutiny of APCD data quality, officials in 
Minnesota also used the statewide hospital discharge database “as a 
reference database, benchmarking the APCD with the hospitalization 
data for validity checks” (APCD Council 2015: 59). States such as 
Colorado, Vermont, and Massachusetts also developed special data use 
agreements and user affidavits to deal with restrictions on access to 
Medicare and Medicaid data (APCD Council 2015: 52). New Hampshire 
also undertook innovations to improve the salience and usability of its 
consumer-facing database, which helped to highlight “wide gaps in 
provider practices—particularly between hospital outpatient 
departments and freestanding facilities” (Tu and Gourevitch 2014: 3).  
A final infrastructure that APCD advocates built upon was the 
network of state agencies that had long managed hospital discharge 
databases. These agencies were often state departments of health or 
independent data commissions such as the Pennsylvania Health Care 
Cost Containment Council (PHC4) (Love, Paita, and Custer 2001). 
While many of these organizations were capable of managing small-
scale data projects, most lacked the organizational capacity to take on 
large, politically volatile projects such as APCDs, which required a 
greater level of expertise and ability to negotiate with multiple 
stakeholders. During the early implementation of APCD legislation, 
New York's Department of Health, for example, had difficulty carrying 
out most claims database functions, and lacked a process for securing 
stakeholder support (Miller et al. 2015: 6–7).  
To address these challenges, states retooled their existing 
organizational structures to buffer APCDs from political conflict. For 
instance, rather than housing the APCD in existing state data agencies 
or departments of health, states such as Virginia and Colorado created 
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independent, nonprofit organizations that allowed data stakeholders to 
directly collaborate in decision making (APCD Council 2015: 32). 
States such as Vermont and Massachusetts, by contrast, built 
collaborative governance into existing independent state agencies 
through advisory boards (CHIA 2011; GMCB 2015). Similarly, the 
Maine Health Data Organization integrated payers, consumers, 
employers, and providers directly into a twenty-one-member policy 
board, which oversaw data collection, distribution, analysis, and 
rulemaking (Prysunka 2010: 11). In sum, as with databases 
themselves, these organizational innovations reworked prior state 
infrastructure to support new policies.  
Transparency and the New Politics of Prices 
The APCD Council's efforts at institutional reconfiguration—
reshaping policy ideas, reassembling existing infrastructures, and 
repurposing tactical repertoires—have led to significant changes in the 
politics and policy of price transparency. First, by reshaping ideas 
about how to improve the effectiveness of information on health 
prices, the APCD Council has helped to popularize claims databases as 
a critical tool for advocates of payment reform. In 2009, employer 
associations concerned with improving the value of health care, 
together with the Pacific Business Group on Health and the California 
Healthcare Foundation, formed an organization called Catalyst for 
Payment Reform (CPR) (CPR 2015). In its mission to drive “robust 
changes outside of the Medicare program,” CPR vigorously advocates 
for price-transparency legislation to achieve cost savings for 
purchasers, support for consumer choices in the health care market, 
and reductions in unwanted geographical price variation (CPR 2015). 
With high standards for state price-transparency laws, embodied in 
annual scorecards, CPR aims to “take a deeper look at whether these 
laws were achieving the ultimate goal—ensuring consumers have 
access to meaningful information about the price of their health care” 
by examining state laws, regulations, and websites (CPR 2014: i). 
These scorecards treat APCDs as the “ideal source of data” for price 
transparency, in part because they fill in “longstanding gaps” in health 
care information (CPR 2014: 6). As a result, CPR's annual scorecard 
automatically awards 50 out of 100 points to states that use APCDs as 
a data source (CPR 2014: 7).  
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Second, the work of transparency advocates has created new 
forums in which providers, payers, consumers, and public officials 
share ideas related to transparency and build linkages across issues of 
cost and quality. Philanthropic foundations have been powerful, yet 
quiet, partners in this effort (Alcalde 2015; Oakman 2015). In 2013 
and 2015, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation hosted a National 
Healthcare Transparency Summit in Washington, DC generated 
information about alternative transparency innovations embraced by 
both Democrats and Republicans as well as every major transparency 
stakeholder group in the country (National Summit on Health Care 
Price, Cost and Quality Transparency 2015). News coverage of the 
summits reveals a shift in providers’ attitudes toward transparency. As 
the president of one state medical society who attended the 2015 
summit suggested, “physicians have a reputation for being difficult,” 
but they are the “most natural and best partners to lead the 
transparency movement because no one else is as closely aligned with 
patient needs. . . . Physicians are now being asked in many cases to 
not only be responsible for delivering high quality healthcare, but 
they're being asked how we should be delivering high quality 
healthcare at the most appropriate cost possible” (Firth 2015).  
Third, by reassembling existing legal and technical 
infrastructures, the APCD Council has assisted in the implementation 
of payment reform alternatives such as Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs), which depend on integrated, real-time data on 
provider performance and outcomes (Fulton et al. 2015; Shortell et al. 
2015). Massachusetts, for example, is leveraging its APCD as a data 
source to support an ACO initiative under a federal State Innovation 
Model grant (EOHHS 2013: 26). In 2011, the New Hampshire Institute 
for Health Policy and Practice received a Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation grant to use the state's APCD to create quality metrics 
(Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman 2014: 672). These researchers also 
used the APCD to evaluate how well statewide ACO projects controlled 
per-member costs (Porter and Love 2013).  
Finally, the APCD Council's tactical repertoire has also permitted 
the development of a broader coalition behind price transparency 
reforms at the state level. Consumer groups such as Families USA 
argue that “states can play a pivotal role in improving price 
transparency” and that “moving forward, states should consider taking 
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steps to improve consumer access to meaningful price and quality 
information” (Families USA 2014: 10). Insurers now publicly advocate 
for “a parsimonious set of meaningful and useful” provider 
performance indicators that expand transparency in cost beyond public 
programs (Kramer 2013: 1). Most importantly, while provider groups 
remain concerned about inaccuracies of individual-level cost data, the 
American Hospital Association now argues that “state governments, 
working with their state hospital associations, should expand existing 
efforts to make hospital charge information available to consumers” 
(AHA 2014b: 2).  
Evidence that this broad coalition can act collectively can be 
found in the case of Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
(577 U.S. ___ [2016]), in which Vermont's APCD attempted to 
overturn a Second Circuit ruling that the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) preempts state data submission requirements for 
employer-sponsored self-insured health plans (Lacey 2015). Vermont's 
petition received support in the form of amicus briefs from a cross-
cutting set of over twenty stakeholders (SCOTUSblog 2015). These 
briefs were filed not only by NAHDO, the APCD Council, and numerous 
organizations of state officials (including the NGA and the NAIC), but 
also the American Medical Association and the American Hospital 
Association, both of which argued that APCDs are a critical component 
of their efforts to develop and use health data to improve patient 
outcomes (AHA and AAMC 2015; AMA and VMS 2015). By contrast, 
only one amicus brief—whose coauthors included the ERISA Industry 
Committee, AHIP, and the US Chamber of Commerce—was filed in 
favor of Liberty Mutual (SCOTUSblog 2015).  
As could be expected given the Supreme Court's tendency to 
expansively interpret ERISA preemption, the justices did not readily 
side with APCD advocates. In a 6–2 opinion authored by Justice 
Kennedy, the Court held that ERISA preempts Vermont's statute as 
applied to self-insured plans because it regulates the collection of plan 
information, which is a key facet of plan administration (Gobeille v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company). In the aftermath of this decision, 
APCD advocates may still be able to rely on their existing repertoire of 
coalition building to overcome this policy roadblock. This is particularly 
true given the support APCD advocates have sought and received from 
numerous key stakeholders as well as federal officials, including in the 
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Department of Labor, which the Gobeille majority ruled is alone 
authorized to administer the reporting requirements of ERISA plans, 
and supported the United States’ amicus brief for Vermont 
(Rosenbaum 2016). As Justice Breyer's concurrence suggests, states 
may be able to petition to develop ERISA reporting requirements that 
meets states’ needs or delegate some authority to states to obtain 
such data. In July 2016, the Employee Benefits Security Administration 
also proposed a rule eliminating provisions that exempted small, self-
insured group health plans from filing Form 5500 (Jost 2016). While 
this form does not collect the kind of detailed information required by 
APCDs, the rule may signal the continued interest in promoting data 
collection on the part of the broad, intergovernmental coalition built by 
APCD advocates thus far (Newman 2016).  
Conclusion 
Our study suggests that there has been a significant shift in 
state-level efforts to address the problem of rising health care prices. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, rate-setting regimes ran into political 
and institutional barriers that existed at the state level (McDonough 
1997a, b; Hackey 1998). While existing scholarship helps to explain 
the breakdown of these regimes, we show that a new policy model has 
emerged in their place which emphasizes the role of health data 
transparency as a necessary component of reform and uses APCDs as 
a key policy instrument. The rise of APCDs, we suggest, emerged from 
a process of institutional reconfiguration (Berk and Galvan 2013; Berk, 
Galvan, and Hattam 2013). To address political and institutional 
barriers to reform, APCD advocates leveraged an existing network of 
health data experts at NAHDO. The APCD Council built on and 
reshaped NAHDO policy ideas about when transparency reforms work; 
repurposed tactical repertoires such as capacity borrowing to shore up 
APCD efforts in states with few resources; and reassembled existing 
legislation, databases, and state data agencies to cope with 
technological hurdles and political opposition to transparency 
initiatives.  
The Council's efforts have made states into viable sites for 
price-transparency reforms, and have made APCDs a key instrument 
in those reforms. The political success of APCDs notwithstanding, 
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however, recent research suggests that the effect of transparency on 
prices is conditional at best (Austin and Gravelle 2007).11 Two reasons 
for this are worth highlighting here. First, transparency alone cannot 
address the persistent problem of noncompetitive health care markets. 
For example, since the implementation of a strong transparency 
regime, New Hampshire faced difficulty in reducing prices, in part 
because of a highly uncompetitive hospital marketplace (Tu and 
Gourevitch 2014). Second, as Cutler and Dafny (2011) argue, 
transparency can also incentivize hospitals to raise their prices, 
especially in markets where insurers have fewer exit options.12 Despite 
these limitations to price transparency, there is evidence that greater 
attention to prices by political leaders can affect market outcomes. 
Ellison and Wolfram (2006) have, for instance, found evidence that 
political attention to the Clinton health reform initiative led to a 
dramatic decrease in prescription drug price growth in the 1990s. 
Thus, fulfilling the promise of price transparency reforms may, as Weil 
et al. (2006) argue, require that the information they generate 
becomes embedded in the everyday routines of political actors rather 
than market participants alone.  
Beyond the case of APCDs, this study has implications for how 
we understand the relationship between American federalism and 
health care reform. As scholars such as McDonough (1997a, b), 
Hackey (1998), Barrilleaux and Brace (2007), and Gray, Lowery, and 
Benz (2013) suggest, states experience fiscal, institutional, and 
political constraints that make it difficult to drive significant health 
policy innovation. At the same time, a variety of scholars have 
suggested that states often play a key role as policy laboratories, 
capable of experimenting with and diffusing robust health care reforms 
(Sparer, France, and Clinton 2011; Thompson 2012). In contrast to 
both of these perspectives, our pragmatist account suggests that 
states’ ability to serve as laboratories for health care reform is highly 
conditional on whether or not policy entrepreneurs mine state 
experiences of public policy to distill lessons about “what works,” and 
reassemble promising policy ideas, tactical repertoires, and 
infrastructures into policy models that have a higher likelihood of 
success (Berk, Galvan, and Hattam 2013; Heller, Hoffman, and 
Bindman 2014). All-payer claims database advocates relied on NAHDO 
as an available source of knowledge on ideas, tactics, and 
infrastructures. Yet, unlike entrepreneurs in Kingdon's (1984) multiple 
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streams framework, these reformers did not simply use available 
materials in “raw” form. Rather, they redeployed raw materials—
reshaping old ideas, repurposing existing tactics, and reassembling 
existing databases and state laws—to support a new policy goal. Had 
the transparency advocates not had access to these raw materials, or 
if they had viewed states as poor venues for reform, it is unlikely the 
APCDs would have emerged when and how they did.  
By uncovering how institutional reconfiguration led to the 
emergence of APCDs, our study also suggests several future directions 
for research on the politics of health care reform. Rather than 
proposing to test the effect of institutional structures such as 
federalism or bicameralism on health policy innovations, future 
research should catalogue the practices that successful (and 
unsuccessful) policy entrepreneurs deploy across a variety of 
institutional settings. In particular, further studies should explore the 
extent to which institutional reconfiguration helps to explain health 
policy change. Because policy innovation is frequently about creating 
something new based on existing intellectual and institutional 
resources, reconfiguration is a major form of agency in the policy 
process (Campbell 2004; Carstensen 2011). So far, little has been 
written about the role of reconfiguration in health care reform or in the 
context of federalism more broadly. The results of this study suggest 
that future research on health care and federalism should pay greater 
attention to this process of institutional change.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A  
Documents Analyzed (N = 33)  
Title Author(s) Date 
Manual/Guidebook (N = 6) 
All-Payer Claims Database Development 
Manual: Establishing a Foundation for Health 
Care Transparency and Informed Decision 
Making  
Jo Porter, Denise Love, 
Amy Costello, Ashley 
Peters, Barbara 
Rudolph 
2015 
Model All-Payer Claims Database Legislation Lucy Hodder, Jo Porter, 
Ashley Peters 
2015 
Recommendations for Collecting Payer 
Information on Plan Benefit Design and 
Payments to Providers for Non-Claims based 
Services 
APCD Council, NHIHPP, 
NAHDO 
2014 
Developing an APCD Request for Proposal: 
Guidance for States 
Denise Love, Jane 
Sachs 
2013 
APCD Technical Build Guidance Document Denise Love, Alan 
Prysunka 
2011 
Cost and Funding Considerations for a 
Statewide All-Payer Claims Database (APCD) 
Denise Love, Emily 
Sullivan 
2011 
Analysis of Past APCD Efforts (N = 4) 
New York's All-Payer Database: A New Lens 
for Consumer Transparency 
Patrick Miller, Ashley 
Peters, Jo Porter, Emily 
Sullivan 
2015 
APCD Legislation: Review of Current Practices 
and Critical Elements 
Patrick Miller, Ashley 
Peters 
2013 
Key State Health Care Databases for 
Improving Health Care Delivery 
Denise Love, Claudia 
Steiner 
2011 
All-Payer Claims Databases: State Initiatives 
to Improve Health Care Transparency 
Denise Love, William 
Custer, Patrick Miller 
2010 
Issue Brief or Fact Sheet (N = 9) 
The Basics of All-Payer Claims Databases: A 
Primer for States 
Jo Porter, Denise Love, 
Ashley Peters, Jane 
Sachs, and Amy 
Costello 
2014 
A Stewardship Framework for the Use of 
Community Health Data 
Larry Green 2012 
Why State All-Payer Claims Databases Matter 
to Employers 
Patrick Miller 2012 
APCD 2.0: The Next Evolution Patrick Miller 2011 
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Title Author(s) Date 
Fact Sheet: APCD and Health Reform Jo Porter 2011 
Standardization of Data Collection in All-Payer 
Claims Databases 
Amy Costello, Mary 
Taylor 
2011 
All-Payer Claims Databases: An Overview for 
Policymakers 
Patrick Miller, Denise 
Love, Emily Sullivan, 
Josephine Porter, Amy 
Costello 
2010 
All-Payer Claims Database Fact Sheet Alan Prysunka 2010 
All-Payer Claims Databases: A Key to 
Healthcare Reform 
Suffolk University Law 
School 
2009 
Other (N = 3) 
History of APCD Council Harmonization Efforts APCD Council 2011 
Proposal for State Access to Medicare: Letter 
to Senator Baucus 
Denise Love 2009 
Proposal for State Access to Medicare: Letter 
to Senator Grassley 
Denise Love 2009 
Webinars (N = 11) 
AHRQ Webinar—Improving Cost Transparency 
and Quality of Care: APCDs Working for You - 
Lessons Learned in the Release of APCD 
Analytics—July 8, 2015  
AHRQ 2015 
APCD Council Innovative Uses of APCDs, Part 
2—May 18, 2015 
APCD Council 2015 
APCD Council APCD Development Manual 
Overview—March 31, 2015 
APCD Council 2015 
AHRQ Webinar—Improving Cost Transparency 
and Quality of Care: APCDs Working for You—
March 19, 2015 
AHRQ 2015 
APCD Council Innovative Uses of APCDs, Part 
1—March 9, 2015 
APCD Council 2015 
APCD Council Provider Identification 
Webinar—May 2, 2014 
APCD Council 2014 
APCD Council Risk Adjustment and Rate 
Review Webinar—April 10, 2014 
APCD Council 2014 
APCD Council Overview Webinar—November 
15, 2013 
APCD Council 2013 
NAHDO All-Payer Claims Database (APCD) 
Overview and Applications for Public Health 
Presentation—March 17, 2011 
NAHDO 2011 
CDC Surveillance Science Advisory Group 
Webinar—January 27, 2011 
CDC 2011 
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Title Author(s) Date 
AHRQ-USHIK, NAHDO, and the APCD Council: 
New State Tool Support Webinar—December 
8, 2010 
AHRQ, NAHDO, APCD 
Council 
2010 
 
Appendix B  
Documents Not Included in Analysis (N = 27)  
Title Author(s) Date 
State Models for Health Care Cost Measurement: A 
Policy and Operational Framework 
Rachel Block 2015 
Multi-Payer Claims Database/Task 12: Summary 
Report and Recommended Design Option 
Avalere Health 2010 
Moving Markets: Lessons from New Hampshire's 
Health Care Price Transparency Experiment 
Ha Tu, Rebecca Gourevitch 2014 
State of the States: Laying the Foundation for 
Health Reform 
State Coverage Initiatives 2011 
Releasing Medicare Claims Data to Support Quality 
Improvement Initiatives: Legal Barriers and 
Opportunities 
Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Erica 
Pereira, Sara Rosenbaum 
2010 
Impact of Health Care Price Transparency on Price 
Variation: The New Hampshire Experience 
Ha Tu, Johanna Lauer 2009 
The Impact of Price Transparency on HealthCost 
Services in New Hampshire 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2009 
Report on the Impact of House Bill 790 – An Act 
Relative to Dependent Coverage for Health 
Insurance 2007 Session 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2008 
2007–2011 Vermont Health Care Cost and 
Utilization Report 
HCCI 2014 
CIVHC State Agency vs. Qualified Entity Comparison 
Document 
CIVHC 2014 
Vermont's Analytic Methodology HCCI 2014 
Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost 
Drivers 
Office of Attorney General, 
Martha Coakley 
2011 
State Data Spotlight: Maine's Health Care Claims 
Database 
SHADAC 2011 
A Commercial Insurance Study of Vaginal Delivery 
and Cesarean Section Rates at New Hampshire 
Hospitals 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2011 
A Study of Ground Ambulance Transport 
Commercial Claims Data 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2011 
The Impact of Aging on Medical Care Services 
Covered by Commercial Insurance in New 
Hampshire 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2010 
A Study of NH vs. Out of State Medical Care 
Spending and Carrier Differences 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2010 
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Title Author(s) Date 
Report: Tri-State Variation in Health Services 
Utilization & Expenditures in Northern New England 
Karl Finison 2010 
Payments to Providers: An Inside Look at Carrier 
Discounts 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2010 
New Hampshire Acute Care Hospital Comparison: A 
Commercial Insurance Relative Cost Comparison 
New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2008 
Report on Patient Contributions to Medical Expenses New Hampshire Insurance 
Department 
2008 
All-Payer Claims Databases: Unlocking the Potential Rebecca Paradis, Erin 
Bartolini 
2014 
Why State All-Payer Claims Databases Matter to 
Employers 
Patrick Miller 2012 
Standardization of Data Collection in All-Payer 
Claims Databases 
Amy Costello, Mary Taylor 2011 
Collecting Health Data National Conference of 
State Legislatures 
2010 
Analysis of HHS Proposed Rules on Reinsurance, 
Risk Corridors, and Risk Adjustment 
Wakely Consulting Group 2011 
Overview of the Multi-Payer Claims Database 
(MPCD) 
OptumInsight 2011 
Footnotes 
1 According to the World Health Organization, in the United States, per capita 
expenditures reached $8,895 in 2012: 
www.who.int/countries/usa/en/.  
2 On the definition of policy instrument, see Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007).  
3 For examples of capacity borrowing outside health policy, see Evans (2011).  
4 As Amberg (2013: 104) puts it, “Reformers . . . create a discursive context 
in which agents can imagine how to recombine their relationships in 
ways that could make them more effective in the new context than 
they were in the old.”  
5 For another example of how states creatively use available resources in the 
context of health policy, see Heller, Hoffman, and Bindman (2014).  
6 For a lists of documents analyzed and of those not included in analysis, see 
Appendixes A and B.  
7 To be sure, there have always been multiple rationales for requiring the 
disclosure of health data, yet the market rationale, as Sage (1999) 
suggests, is the one most commonly articulated.  
8 These standards included structured reports for common data requests, 
customized user reports created for specific employer groups or 
providers, web query systems for consumers and purchasers, 
transparency websites that post median prices for common procedures 
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by facilities and/or payers, as well as files designed specifically for 
researchers.  
9 Miller also provided examples of how New Hampshire's APCD, by including 
outpatient claims, captured important indicators that reflected changes 
in the health market (NHIHPP 2009: 11–12).  
10 Business allies were particularly likely to be suspicious about arguments 
focused on prices rather than service volume as contributing to health 
care costs (see White 2011).  
11 But see Wu et al. (2014).  
12 See also Kyle and Ridley (2007).  
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